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Abstract
This paper investigates whether monetary and fiscal policies, such as lump−sum taxes,
distortionary taxation and monetization of public deficit, have criminal impacts. We address
this question extending the neoclassical monetary growth model. We have demonstrated that
fiscal policies affect crime through government spending. Conversely, the effect of monetary
policy, especially inflation, on crime depends on the separability of the utility function.
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Crime is an extremely important political and economic issue in our day. The
considerable costs imposed by crime on its victims and society greatly exceed
the private beneﬁts of crime (Becker, 1968; Fender 1999). However, there is
deﬁnitely no consensus among policy-makers or scholars on how to deal with
this problem. This lack of agreement has undoubtedly been brought about
by the complexity of the phenomenon, and research on this issue is being
conducted in many areas.
In light of this fact, since the seminal article by Becker (1968) 1 , crime has
been formally dealt with by economists through the construction of micro-
fundaments in order to better understand the reasons why agents take part in
illicit activities.
Becker’s original approach introduces a type of rational behavior in which
agents compare their expected returns with the costs of committing a crime,
so that the criminal activity will be engaged in if the expected returns surpass
the legal alternatives. Therefore, the criminal, as well as the other agents,
are considered economic agents who respond to stimuli in a market setting,
and whose behavior may be studied by way of an equilibrium study in an
optimizing framework.
This article follows the tradition of economic models used to study crime
founded by Becker in order to construct an intertemporal general equilibrium
model that will allow us to study the relation between macroeconomic policies
and crime. In this sense, several articles have recently observed that problems
such as unequal distribution of income, poverty, and unemployment have ef-
fects on crime (e.g. Hunag et. al., 2002; Burdett et. al., 2003). It is therefore
possible to expect that, in certain circumstances, monetary and ﬁscal policies
also aﬀect crime. Also, the monetary and growth literature has indicated a re-
lation between crime and inﬂation, if the real eﬀects of inﬂation are considered.
In this context, if the Tobin eﬀect (Tobin, 1965) is veriﬁed, then inﬂation would
have a positive eﬀect on production (negative on unemployment), which could
have a negative eﬀect on crime. On the other hand, if the anti-Tobin eﬀect is
veriﬁed (e.g. Stockman, 1981) then inﬂation may be criminally friendly.
The goal of this article is to investigate, in a neoclassical monetary growth
context ` a la Sidrauski (1967), how ﬁscal and monetary policies aﬀect crime.
Policies such as the monetization of the public deﬁcit, lump-sum taxation, and
distortionary taxation are evaluated with regard to their impact on economic
1 Other articles that have dealt with the issue of crime in the economic literature
are Fleisher (1966), Tullok (1967) and Rotemberg (1968), among others (see Ehrlich,
1996)
1agents’ decision to engage in criminal activity. Special attention has been given
to the inﬂation eﬀects on crime.
Section 2 outlines the standard model in which crime is inserted in the Sidrauski
(1967) model, where the eﬀects of the monetization of the public deﬁcit are
investigated. Section 3 covers the relation between ﬁscal policy and crime, and
Section 4 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Monetary Policy and Crime
The relation between monetary policy and crime shall be considered according
to the hypothesis by which the government emits money to ﬁnance its deﬁcit.
This means that crime is incorporated in the Sidrauski (1967) model in order
to make it possible to consider the consequences that the monetization of the
public deﬁcit have on crime. The modeling of the relation between the several
variables and ﬁscal and monetary policy, according to the Sindrauski model, is
habitual in economic literature. In that sense the model adopted in this study
follows closely Faria (1998).
In order to incorporate crime in the Sidrauski (1967) monetary growth model
we initially consider that criminal activity is a diseconomy to production, since
negative externalities are generated, thus following the rationale of Becker
(1968). This takes place because productive resources are allocated towards
an unproductive activity such as crime, having adverse eﬀects on agents’ well
being. This hypothesis may be directly inserted in the Sidrauski model by
introducing crime in the economy’s production function.
While agents are stimulated to engage in criminal activities according to the
expected positive returns, they are also subject to the eﬀects of crime, with
loss in income. According to this idea, we may argue that the total income of
a representative agent of this economy will be given by (1).
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= 0, if o = ¯ o
> 0, if o > ¯ o
< 0, if o < ¯ o
2Thus, f(k,o) represents the production function, where k is the initial capital
stock, with fk > 0, and o the number of hours spent on criminal activity, with
fo < 0. On the other hand, φ(k,o, ¯ o) represents the net income function of the
criminal activity, where the agent chooses the number of hours that will be
dedicated to crime, when faced with the average number of hours of the other
agents, ¯ o. This type of function is commonly used in illicit activity models
such as in Ehrlich and Lui (1999).
It must also be pointed out that k appears here in the criminal activity returns
function. This is done in order to represent the increase in the expected returns
from crime as the economy grows, increasing its capital stock. This hypothesis
is widely supported by stylized facts, such as the evident diﬀerence between
big city crime rates and the crime rates in small towns and/or rural areas,
making it clear that in locations with greater capital stocks (e.g. big cities)
there is a signiﬁcantly greater incidence of crime per capita.
As pointed out by Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) these facts may be explained
by several arguments, such as the decrease in the probability the criminal will
be punished, the lower costs of criminal activity, or eventhe increase in the
expected returns from crime in locations with a high capital stock.
In Sidrauski’s model, the representative agent maximizes the current value
of his/her utility function subject to a budget constraint where income is al-
located between a physical asset and a monetary asset. If we consider that
criminal activity directly aﬀects the well-being of an agent, and if we incorpo-






s.t. ˙ k + ˙ m = Y − c + x − π m
(2)
Therefore, assuming there is no population growth, m represents the real mon-
etary balance of the economy, where c is consumption, x are the government
lump-sum transfers, ρ is the temporal preference rate, and π is the rate of in-
ﬂation. All the variables are deﬁned in per capita terms. By substituting (1) in




uo + λ{fo + fo φ + f φo} = 0 (4)
˙ λ
λ
= ρ − {fk + fk φ + f φk} (5)
Since all agents are considered identical, and are confronted with the same
3maximization problem, we have that o = ¯ o becomes an equilibrium condition.
At the same time, we have that in a steady state, the lump-sum government
transfer is,
x ≡ σm = πm ⇒ σ = π (6)
meaning that the rate of monetary growth (σ) is equal to the rate of inﬂation.
The impact of monetary policy may then be captured by inﬂation.
At the same time, since in this model’s steady-state the per capita variables
remain constant, meaning that the shadow-price of capital remains constant,
we have that the following equations complete the steady-state condition.
uo + λ (fo + f φo) = 0 (7)
ρ = (fk + f φk) (8)
c = f(k,o) (9)
Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by equations (3), (7),
(8) and (9). Equation (3) supplies us with the marginal rate of substitution
between currency and consumption, and equation (7) supplies us with the op-
timal rule for the construction of a marginal rate of substitution between crime
and consumption and/or money, since λ may be easily related to its marginal
utilities. Equation (8) concludes, as foreseen by the golden rule, that the tem-
poral preference rate will be diﬀerent than the marginal product of capital,
and Equation (9) demonstrates that the product will be entirely consumed.
The relationship between monetary policy and crime may be determined from
these equations, as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Monetary policy aﬀects crime if the agents’ utility function is
not additively separable.
Proof: If the utility function is additionally separable the system is block
recursive, so that equations (7), (8) and (9) may then be used to obtain the
optimal levels of k, c and o, regardless of m, whose optimal level may be
obtained, as a consequence, from (3). On the other hand, if the utility function
is not additionally separable, the (3), (7)-(9) system becomes simultaneous,
and the real and nominal variables are no longer independent. Inﬂation will
particularly aﬀect the optimal level of crime.
Proposition 1 states that if the quantity of money held by an agent does not
aﬀect the marginal utility of crime, then inﬂation will not aﬀect the incidence
4of crime in the economy. Thus, the link between monetary policy and crime
that is constructed with this model is the relation between currency and crime
in its utility function.
In this context, it is important to remember that both the number of hours
spent engaging in criminal activity and the quantity of currency are the ingre-
dients of a choice between income and leisure that an agent must make, for if
the agent opts for more money, he or she will have more leisure time, while
more hours spent engaging in an illicit activity would mean less leisure time,
compensated by greater income. Thus, criminal activity is directly related to
an increase in an agent’s consumption. If we consider that currency plays a
role in minimizing transaction costs, or that it is necessary for consumption,
then there will be no reason for currency and hours spent on crime to be
separable in the utility function.
An alternative rationale would be to imagine a money-less economy, in which
all negotiations are conducted through bartering. In this case, criminal activity
would involve a series of costs, since the transport and exchange of stolen goods
would create additional costs for said activity. This illustrates that money
may lead to a reduction in the costs of crime, since there would a disutility
in criminal activity, making it possible to support the idea of non-separability
between currency and crime.
3 Fiscal Policy and Crime
3.1 Lump-Sum Taxation
In order to evaluate the impacts of ﬁscal policy on crime in this model, the
Turnovsky (1995) approach has been adapted. This approach introduces a
new argument to the utility function, g (government spending). In the current
context, said spending could be related to the government’s law enforcement
policy. The other modiﬁcation of the model would a budget restriction, in






s.t. ˙ k + ˙ m = Y − c − T − π m
(10)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain the following steady-state condition,
c + g = f(k,o) (11)
5along with equations (3), (7) and (8). It must be pointed out that equation
(11) arises from the fact the government ﬁnances its deﬁcit by printing money:
g − T = ˙ m + πm (12)
It is now possible to study the impacts of ﬁscal policy on crime, according to
what is stated in propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 If the utility function is additively separable, then only ﬁscal
policy will aﬀect crime.
Proof: If the utility function is additively separable, then the (3), (7), (8)
and (11) system is block recursive, and equations (7), (8) and (11) may be
used to obtain the optimal levels of k, c and o, regardless of m, whose optimal
level may be obtained from (3). On the other hand, changes in g aﬀect the
real variables, especially crime.
Proposition 3 If the utility function is not additively separable, then both
ﬁscal and monetary policy will aﬀect crime.
Proof: If the utility function is not additively separable, the system (3), (7),
(8), and (11) becomes simultaneous, the real and nominal variables become
non-independent, and monetary policy then aﬀects crime, for inﬂation will
aﬀect the optimal choice of hours spent on an criminal activity. Fiscal policy
continues to aﬀect crime following the same rationale as stated in Proposition
2.
According to proposition 2, only ﬁscal policy has an impact on crime, while
according to proposition 3, that suggests non-separability from the utility
function, both ﬁscal and monetary policies aﬀect crime directly, corroborating
proposition 1, discussed above.
3.2 Distortionary Taxation
In order to introduce distortionary taxation in our model, we shall consider
taxation as being a function of total consumption:
T = T(c) (13)
6Substituting (13) in (10) and solving the problem, only equation (3) will be







Therefore, it becomes clear that none of the previous propositions shall be
altered if distortionary taxation of this sort is considered. Thus, even in the
case of distortionary taxation, the eﬀects of monetary policy on crime will
continue to depend on the non-separability of the utility function. The only
alteration that will occur will be the magnitude of the eﬀects of ﬁscal and
monetary policies on crime.
4 Conclusion
The investigation into why an optimizing agent would engage in an illicit activ-
ity has been the subject of several recent studies, having reached prominence
in economic research. In this context, the present article has constructed an
intertemporal general equilibrium model with micro-fundaments in order to
discuss the relation between macroeconomic policies and crime. The mone-
tization of the public deﬁcit, lump-sum taxation, and distortionary taxation
were analyzed. We have demonstrated that ﬁscal policies aﬀect crime through
government spending. Conversely, the eﬀect of monetary policy, especially in-
ﬂation, on crime depends on the separability of the utility function.
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